Abstract: Hong Kong has been long recognised as a leading global city when it comes to fixed broadband performance. Unlike many other leading broadband markets, this has occurred without any financial support from the Hong Kong government. The removal, rather than an increase, of regulation of the privately-owned broadband network operators has been the overwhelming main driver of this outcome. The key factors driving this outcome have been an open market with low barriers to entry, aggressive competition between network operators, low network build costs and innovative marketing to stimulate demand for higher-speed broadband service. The successful rollout of profitable competing Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) across the city demonstrates that fibre networks are not always and everywhere utility-style natural monopolies. However, the lack of a universal service obligation for broadband does also mean that in areas where competition is neither technically nor economically feasible approximately 10% to 15% of Hong Kong households are not benefiting from this policy.
sharing of network build activity was achieved (ie. sharing of trenches, ducts etc) however, the majority of the optical fibre networks involved separate cable plant and exchange facilities.
Investment was driven by competition in the enterprise market between these four operators.
This focus on optical fibre build out for enterprise market services was similar to many other large cities after the removal of monopoly protection for the incumbent telecommunications operator.
Residential broadband services were launched in Hong Kong during the early 2000s, a similar timeframe to other markets. By the end of 2002, Hong Kong ranked second out of some of the global market leaders with takeup rates at 42% of Hong Kong households. Three technologies were used during this initial residential deployment phase.
Firstly, ADSL over existing copper telephone cabling was used by PCCW-HKT to provide services from its network of telephone exchanges. Competition was facilitated by unbundled local loop (ULL) regulations that required PCCW-HKT to lease exchange-based copper loops to other licensed operators and for in-building sub-loops between all licensed operators (as some new operators were owners of in-building sub-loops via their real estate interests).
Secondly, using DOCSIS on existing cable TV infrastructure, Hong Kong Cable Television (HKCTV) was able to provide broadband services after being granted a telecommunication licence in 2000.
Lastly, using Ethernet over newly-installed Category-5 cabling (normally used in enterprise networks) by Hong Kong Broadband Network (HKBN), which had been granted a fixed wireless licence in 1999. HKBN was a 100% owned subsidiary of City Telecom which had commenced business in Hong Kong in 1992 by providing international calling card services.
HKBN initially used a combination of Local Multipoint Distribution Services (LMDS), wireless backhaul and leased lines to connect residential households to its core network infrastructure This large build of alternative customer access networks in parallel with the regulated ULL regime was a positive sign that an investment appetite existed in the Hong Kong market. The regulator was keen to keep this momentum going.
The responses of the five competitors to PCCW-HKT was crucial in determining whether there was sufficient appetite for investment in new network infrastructure existed.
In the end the result was as follows: As can be seen from the above table there was a split between the "pro-investment" and the "pro-regulation" cases. Interestingly, both the largest and the smallest competitors to PCCW- HKT were aligned, pushing for infrastructure competition. The companies that had benefited in the enterprise market by infrastructure competition (New World and Wharf) since 1995, but were not actively pursuing residential market share, were pro-regulation. The cable TV infrastructure player was undecided, mainly due to technology concerns regarding possible access to its hybrid fibre coax plants under the regulatory scheme at the time.
Given a strong response from the largest and smallest competitor to PCCW-HKT to pursue a 'pro-investment' withdrawal of the ULL, the regulator decided to move in this direction on an apartment building-by-building basis. The key determinant for each building would be the existence of at least one competitive self-built fixed access infrastructure network capable of telephony and broadband services in addition to the incumbent copper network of PCCW-HKT.
HKCTV's cable TV network, however, was deemed not to be a self-built network for the purposes of this building classification for two reasons. Firstly, the lack of a "conventional" telephony service, secondly the limited bandwidth of HFC services compared to fibre-based services and thirdly the lack of wholesale service on the HFC network were the reasons stated.
The regulator was looking to promote fibre-based infrastructure competition -not competition between HFC and DSL networks. The increase in infrastructure over the four year implementation period of the ULL withdrawal was as follows: A key factor in the successful transition from a ULL competition regime to infrastructure competition was the entry of an aggressive, disruptive competitor -namely HKBN.
In 2005, HKBN launched 1000Mbps (or 1Gbps) symmetric services using its Ethernet-based Category-5 Fibre to the Building (FTTB) network. This service was initially available to onethird of Hong Kong's households.
The push to higher speeds (ie. 100Mbps and 1Gbps) using Ethernet technology was a key differentiator against the xDSL-based incumbent and other competitors. By focussing exclusively on Ethernet and VoIP telephony services (rather than legacy xDSL and PSTN)
HKBN was able to minimise costs and price aggressively to grow market share. The Fibre Investment Era
After the full withdrawal of regulated ULL services, the stage was set for Hong Kong's market to shift to competition based on full end-to end-fibre services.
In 
No Natural Monopoly for Fibre Network
The investment and profitability of three separate GPON FTTH networks in Hong Kong dispels the myth that fibre networks are everywhere and always natural monopolies.
Natural monopolies occur where the revenues available in a market can only support the cost (capital and operating costs) of one supplier. Utilities such as electricity, gas and water networks have been typically understood to be natural monopolies. The legacy copper telephone system was also a natural monopoly until mobile and broadband technologies created competing network infrastructure and new services that increased revenues.
Hong Kong demonstrates clearly that broadband residential networks can generate revenues high enough to sustain multiple suppliers with parallel infrastructure networks that compete for business. Hong Kong's consumer broadband prices are some of the cheapest in the world, yet the revenues have supported the build and operation of multiple networks rather than being used to increase monopoly rents to shareholders. Over-regulation which retards investment in new technologies has also been avoided, providing Hong Kong with a key asset to support its social and economic well-being for the 21 st century.
Of course this is not possible in all broadband markets. Hong Kong has a number of key advantages that have enabled this competitive industry structure:
1. High population density driving down unit costs of fibre network construction.
2. Good incomes that enable consumers to afford higher value services.
3. Open information economy that has ensured high value attributed to fast broadband services.
4. Competitive, entrepreneurial spirit that has driven risk taking and investment.
5. A regulator that is able to operate independently of other government departments and politics in general.
All of these advantages are important. If one is missing then it is likely that competition will not deliver profitable outcomes, with monopolies and/or subsidised networks being the result.
Hong Kong, with its successful, market-based city economy has significant advantages that are not available in all markets. Many cities have these characteristics in Asia, North America and Europe; however the cities are parts of larger national fixed telecommunications markets that do not universally exhibit all these advantages.
Deployment of fibre-based broadband infrastructure across large national markets is undoubtedly more difficult than in Hong Kong. Some areas (eg. vibrant, densely populated cities) will exhibit the necessary characteristics for competition at the infrastructure level to be successful, other areas will be natural monopolies or uneconomic for any fibre deployment. If these national markets were considered as an aggregation of a range of sub-markets involving major cities, regional and remote areas rather than one homogenous market (which they certainly are not from an infrastructure perspective) then it may be possible to bring more competition at the network level to the major cities rather than delivering lowest-commondenominator broadband for all.
The deployment of mobile networks over the last 20 years has followed this approach. New investment decisions for mobile networks were also guided by a similar range of factors as listed above. Deployments were prioritised into areas where economic returns were greatest in major cities. Competing networks successfully grew customer bases on the back of new and innovative service models that generated increasing funds for further investment into wider geographic areas.
The successful rollout of competing mobile networks in most markets demonstrates the greater efficiencies and innovation stemming from competition rather than the high costs of monopoly rents and regulation that have plagued many fixed networks in their transition from basic telephony to broadband.
The efficiencies that competition brings to the telecommunication infrastructure rollout in major cities, along with the extra economic output from the digital economy that results, is the best source of funding the development of telecommunications infrastructure in areas that lack the advantages of the major cities (eg. regional and rural areas). These efficiencies and extra economic output need to be taxed in ways that provide sufficient funds to support the rollout of infrastructure in areas where these key advantages are lacking. In locations where competition does not drive investment, government has a role to regulate monopolies and fund infrastructure development (both fixed and mobile) where it is uneconomic otherwise.
The alternative approach, of relying on national monopolies to internally cross-subsidise from the highly profitable city areas (where competition is viable) to the high cost regional areas, will result in lagging broadband investment all round as the monopoly seeks to maximise profits by minimising investments and reducing obligations imposed by regulators or governments Hong Kong also has valuable lessons in this regard as even this city economy has remoter villages and islands that have not benefited from the competition to rollout fibre based networks.
available so that this is unlikely to achieve 100% universal fibre coverage.
As mentioned above, the regulator decided to implement a sunset date of 30 June 2008for all regulated ULL services across the entire Hong Kong market. This was done in order to ensure that all buildings where alternative customer access networks were "technically feasible and economically viable" would see infrastructure investment. A hard cutoff date was needed to "reinforce the above arrangements with greater clarity and certainty" (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2004) .
After the sunset date, buildings that were not technically feasible and not economically viable would fall back to being supplied on terms determined by PCCW-HKT. Furthermore, there would be no incentive for PCCW-HKT to rollout fibre infrastructure to these buildings given the high costs and the lack of competition. As a result these areas would be left to be serviced primarily by ADSL or wireless broadband technologies.
This has resulted in households in areas without competition complaining about being left behind the vast majority of Hong Kong when it comes to broadband services (SCMP, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c) . Some households have banded together and paid the substantial sums required by PCCW-HKT to bring fibre infrastructure to particular areas. However, this is clearly restricted to those areas where the households are relatively well-off in economic terms.
The regulator decided to leave any future competition issues with these non-economical buildings to be covered by an "essential facilities" criterion using "established competition law principles" (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2004) established in the USA during the 1980s (OECD, 1996) .
It is difficult to see how reliance on this ex-post type of regulation will assist households in these areas. The small market size means the incentive for competitors to PCCW-HKT to initiate a competition case are extremely low. The regulator may have the power to initiate such action but is unlikely to without support of competitors to PCCW-HKT.
As a result it is likely the situation for many of these areas will remain unchanged unless the Hong Kong government intervenes with an appropriately funded broadband universal service policy that drives fibre investment. A universal service obligation does exist for basic fixed telephony services and public payphones; however the regulator has not indicated any plans to extend this to broadband or mobile services (OFCA, 2017) . Hong Kong has also shown that success in fibre broadband in densely populated areas does not automatically translate to regional and rural areas. In fact it has shown that without government support these areas are left behind with a monopoly that will not invest due to a lack of return on investment.
Hong Kong is an example of what does work and what doesn't work in ensuring broadband
infrastructure is upgraded for the benefit of social and economic development. The lessons learned can be used by many other markets to find better ways to a brighter broadband future.
